Repayment frequency in microfinance contracts with present-biased borrowers

Greg Fischer and Maitreesh Ghatak

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: This paper analyzes the theoretical underpinnings of high-frequency repayment, a feature in nearly all microfinance contracts that has been largely overlooked by theorists. The pervasive belief among practitioners that frequent repayment is critical in achieving high repayment rates is puzzling. Classically rational individuals should benefit from more flexible repayment schedules, and less frequent repayment should increase neither default nor delinquency. This paper proposes a simple explanation based on present bias. For such individuals, more frequent repayment can increase the maximum incentive compatible loan size. However, the welfare effects are ambiguous. More frequent repayment can lead to over-borrowing, reducing welfare as it increases loan sizes.4

Keywords: microfinance; repayment frequency; present-bias (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F3 G3 J1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2010-07
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/58184/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Repayment Frequency in Microfinance Contracts with Present-Biased Borrowers (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:58184

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