Credit rationing, wealth inequality and allocation of talent

Maitreesh Ghatak, Massimo Morelli () and Tomas Sjostrom

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: We study an economy where agents are heterogeneous in terms of observable wealth and unobservable talent. Adverse selection forces creditors to ask for collateral. We study the two-way interaction between rationing in the credit market and the wages offered in the labour market. Both pooling and separating credit contracts can be offered in equilibrium. The minimum wealth needed to obtain a separating contract is decreasing in the wage, whereas the minimum wealth needed for a pooling contract is increasing in the wage. If the first effect dominates, the derived labour demand can be upward sloping, resulting in the possibility of multiple equilibria.

Keywords: Occupational choice; adverse selection; wealth distribution; credit rationing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2002-09
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/5922/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Credit Rationing, Wealth Inequality, and Allocation of Talent (2002)
Working Paper: Credit Rationing, Wealth Inequality, and Allocation of Talent (2002)
Working Paper: Credit rationing, wealth inequality, and allocation of talent (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:5922

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