Risky institutions: political regimes and the cost of public borrowing in early modern Italy

David Chilosi

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: By analyzing a newly compiled data set of interest rates on public annuities in early modern Italy, this article finds that the cost of borrowing fell in spite of growing debts and stagnating fiscal revenues. Feudalism and clerical interference increased the cost of borrowing, while parliaments, wars, and centralized fiscal institutions mattered little. The constitutional representation of creditors may have meant significant markups for republican oligarchs. These results cast doubts on the claim that the growth of absolutism was at the root of Italy's economic decline.

JEL-codes: N13 N43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published in Journal of Economic History, 2014, 74(03), pp. 887-915. ISSN: 0022-0507

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Related works:
Journal Article: Risky Institutions: Political Regimes and the Cost of Public Borrowing in Early Modern Italy (2014)
Working Paper: Risky institutions: political regimes and the cost of public borrowing in early modern Italy (2013)
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