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Optimal contracting and the organization of knowledge

William Fuchs, Luis Garicano () and Luis Rayo

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: We study contractual arrangements that support an efficient use of time in a knowledge-intensive economy in which agents endogenously specialize in either production or consulting. The resulting market for advice is plagued by informational problems, since both the difficulty of the questions posed to consultants and the knowledge of those consultants are hard to assess. We show that spot contracting is not efficient since lemons (in this case, self-employed producers with intermediate knowledge) cannot be appropriately excluded from the market. However, an ex-ante, firm-like contractual arrangement uniquely delivers the first best. This arrangement involves hierarchies in which consultants are full residual claimants of output and compensate producers via incentive contracts. This simple characterization of the optimal ex-ante arrangement suggests a rationale for the organization of firms and the structure of compensation in knowledge-intensive sectors. Our findings correspond empirically to observed arrangements inside professional service firms and between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs.

Keywords: Contracting; experts; professional service firms; partnership; venture capital (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D86 J33 J44 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2014-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cse, nep-knm and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7) Track citations by RSS feed

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Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal Contracting and the Organization of Knowledge (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: Optimal Contracting and the Organization of Knowledge (2014) Downloads
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