The politics of trade agreement design: revisiting the depth-flexibility nexus

Leonardo Baccini, Andreas Dür and Manfred Elsig

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: Existing research indicates the interrelated nature of different dimensions of the design of international institutions. In particular, it shows the greater flexibility of deep agreements. We argue—and demonstrate empirically—that the positive relationship between depth and flexibility holds for preferential trade agreements (PTAs). But we add two qualifications to the conventional wisdom that depth and flexibility go hand in hand. First, we argue that the positive relationship between depth and flexibility proves weaker for democracies than for nondemocracies. Second, when making deep agreements more flexible, countries also add strings to the use of the additional flexibility provisions. An original data set on the design of 587 PTAs allows us to test our arguments. Both descriptive evidence and multivariate statistics support the theoretical expectations. The findings contribute to the literatures on the design of international institutions and the causes and consequences of PTAs.

Keywords: depth; flexibility; institutional design; international institutions; preferential trade agreements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2015-12-11
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

Published in International Studies Quarterly, 11, December, 2015, 59(4), pp. 765 - 775. ISSN: 0020-8833

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:62303

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