Global energy governance: trade, infrastructure, and the diffusion of international organizations

Leonardo Baccini, Veronica Lenzi and Paul W. Thurner

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: Why do states choose to join and form international governmental organizations (IGOs) that regulate energy policy? In this article we make three specific contributions to the literature on international cooperation and diffusion. First, we show that countries form and join energy IGOs in response to memberships previously gained by direct competitors among oil and gas producers and consumers. Moreover, we demonstrate that energy IGOs diffuse among countries that share oil and gas pipelines. Finally, we provide evidence that the institutional design of established energy IGOs impacts the development of their membership network. To test these hypotheses, we rely on original data on oil and gas pipelines and the design of energy IGOs as well as on a newly compiled dataset that includes 152 countries and covers 38 years (1970–2007). We employ both network analysis and spatial econometrics.

Keywords: energy; international organizations; network analysis; spatial econometrics; trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in International Interactions, April, 2013, 39(2), pp. 192-216. ISSN: 0305-0629

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