EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Tenure insecurity and investment in soil conservation. Evidence from Malawi

Stefania Lovo

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: Tenure insecurity can have important consequences for the conservation of natural resources. This paper focuses on two main sources of tenure insecurity, informal short-term tenancy contracts, and customary gender-biased inheritance practices. Using a large plot-level dataset from Malawi, the analysis employs a linear probability model with household fixed effects and finds that both sources of insecurity have a negative effect on soil conservation investments. These findings suggest that future land reforms should deal with the informality of the land rental market and address the gap between users and owners of land created by existing customary practices.

Keywords: tenure insecurity; soil conservation; tenancy; inheritance systems; Malawi (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q15 Q24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (56)

Published in World Development, February, 2016, 78, pp. 219-229. ISSN: 0305-750X

Downloads: (external link)
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/64112/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Tenure Insecurity and Investment in Soil Conservation. Evidence from Malawi (2016) Downloads
Working Paper: Tenure insecurity and investment in soil conservation. Evidence from Malawi (2013) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:64112

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library LSE Library Portugal Street London, WC2A 2HD, U.K.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by LSERO Manager ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-31
Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:64112