The problem with party finance: theoretical perspectives on the funding of party politics

Jonathan Hopkin

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: This article presents some theoretical contours for the study of party finance and its consequences. Two broad issues are explored. First, the article develops an account of changes in patterns of party finance, and in particular the move away from the ‘mass party’ model of funding towards ‘elite party’ and ‘cartel party’ models. Party finance is conceptualized as a collective action problem, and four ‘post-mass party’ financial strategies are identified. Second, the article addresses normative issues, assessing how these four financial models perform in terms of ‘liberal’ and ‘populist’ theories of democracy. It is concluded that the mass party model remains closest to the ‘democratic’ ideal, whilst the state-financed (‘cartel’) model is a reasonable pragmatic response to the decline in party membership.

Keywords: Funding; membership decline; party models; collective action; normative theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F3 G3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-11
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in Party Politics, November, 2004, 10(6), pp. 627-651. ISSN: 1460-3683

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:646

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