Equity dynamics in bargaining without information exchange

Heinrich H. Nax

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: In this paper, completely uncoupled dynamics for n-player bargaining are proposed that mirror key behavioral elements of early bargaining and aspiration adjustment models (Zeuthen, 1930; Sauermann and Selten, 118:577–597 1962). Individual adjustment dynamics are based on directional learning adjustments, solely driven by histories of own realized payoffs. Bargaining this way, all possible splits have positive probability in the stationary distribution of the process, but players will split the pie almost equally most of the time. The expected waiting time for almost equal splits to be played is quadratic.

Keywords: bargaining; cooperative game theory; equity; evolutionary game theory; (completely uncoupled) learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C73 C78 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-pke
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in Journal of Evolutionary Economics, November, 2015, 25(5), pp. 1011-1026. ISSN: 0936-9937

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:65426

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