Medieval matching markets

Lars Boerner and Daniel Quint

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: We study the implementation of brokerage regulations as allocation mechanisms in wholesale markets in pre-modern Central Western Europe. We assemble a data set of 1609 sets of brokerage rules from 70 cities. We analyze the incentives created by the rules that were implemented, compare cities that implemented brokerage to cities that did not, and analyze the choice of how brokers should be compensated and the effect this has on market outcomes. Empirically, we find that larger cities, cities with trade-geographic advantages, cities with merchant interests, and cities with universities were more likely to implement brokerage. We also find that brokers were more likely to be compensated with price-based fees in markets with greater heterogeneity in products and preferences, and with unit fees in markets for more homogeneous products – exactly as our theoretical analysis suggests is optimal.

Keywords: preindustrial markets; market microstructure; efficient matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 N23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 63 pages
Date: 2016
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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/66833/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: MEDIEVAL MATCHING MARKETS (2023)
Working Paper: Medieval matching markets (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:66833

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