Endogenous industry structure in vertical duopoly

Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: This paper examines integration decisions of successive duopolists. It is shown that qualitatively the same pattern of integration emerges whether there is Cournot or Bertrand competition in the input market. The degree of integration in the industry is increasing in the size of the downstream market and decreasing in the average marginal cost of the industry and in the fixed integration cost. There jis a tendency for partial integration when one upstream firm is relatively efficient compared to its rival.

Keywords: endogenous industry structure; vertical duopoly; integration; competition; market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J01 R14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 1994-07
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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/6776/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Endogenous Industry Structure in Vertical Duopoly (1994)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:6776

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