The role of beneficiaries in transnational regulatory processes

Mathias Koenig-Archibugi and Kate Macdonald

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: The editors of this volume highlight the role of intermediaries, alongside regulators and targets, as a way to better understand the outcomes of regulatory processes. Here, we explore the benefits of distinguishing a fourth category of actors: the groups whose interests the rules are meant to protect: the (intended) beneficiaries. We apply that framework to nonstate regulation of labor conditions, where the primary intended beneficiaries are workers and their families, especially in poorer countries. We first outline the different ways in which beneficiaries can relate to regulators, intermediaries, and targets; we then develop conjectures about the effect of different relationships on regulatory impacts and democratic legitimacy in relation to corporate power structures, specifically those embedded in the governance of global supply chains. We illustrate these conjectures primarily with examples from three initiatives—Rugmark, the Fair Labor Association, and the Fairtrade system. We conclude that it matters whether and how beneficiaries are included in the regulatory process.

Keywords: labor regulation; private governance; regulatory intermediaries; beneficiaries; fair trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-03-13
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

Published in Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 13, March, 2017, 670(1), pp. 36-57. ISSN: 0002-7162

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