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Corporate governance objectives of labor union shareholders: evidence from proxy voting

Ashwini Agrawal

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: Labor union pension funds have become increasingly vocal in governance matters; however, their motives are subject to fierce debate. I examine the proxy votes of AFL-CIO union funds around an exogenous change in the union representation of workers across firms. AFL-CIO-affiliated shareholders become significantly less opposed to directors once the AFL-CIO labor organization no longer represents a firm's workers. Other institutional investors, including mutual funds and public pension funds, do not exhibit similar voting behavior. Union opposition is also associated with negative valuation effects. The data suggest that some investors pursue worker interests, rather than maximize shareholder value alone.

JEL-codes: G30 G32 G34 G38 J51 K22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2012-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (52)

Published in Review of Financial Studies, January, 2012, 25(1), pp. 187-226. ISSN: 0893-9454

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Journal Article: Corporate Governance Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders: Evidence from Proxy Voting (2012) Downloads
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