Remittances and vote buying

Ezequiel González-Ocantos, Chad Kiewiet de Jonge and Covadonga Meseguer

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: How does the presence of a large group of remittance recipients in the electorate affect the way political parties in Latin America plan their vote-buying operations during electoral campaigns? Existing research claims that remittances bolster the political autonomy of recipients, allowing them to escape clientelistic networks and making them less attractive targets from the point of view of party machines. Although in the long run remittances may undermine the effectiveness of clientelistic inducements, parties still have strong incentives to distribute gifts and favors among these voters. Cross-national survey evidence and an original list experiment fielded in the aftermath of El Salvador’s 2014 presidential race support the view that remittances alter key attitudes and patterns of political behavior among recipients in ways that are relevant for the electoral strategies of party machines. In particular, remittance recipients are appealing targets for clientelistic exchanges due to the uncertainty of their turnout propensity and their distributive preferences.

JEL-codes: F3 G3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-12-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-pol
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Published in Latin American Research Review, 20, December, 2018, 54(3), pp. 689-707. ISSN: 0023-8791

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