Does sanctioning disabled claimants of unemployment insurance increase labour market inactivity? An analysis of 346 British local authorities between 2009 and 2014

Aaron Reeves

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: Imposing financial penalties on claimants of unemployment insurance may incentivise labour market re-entry. However, sanctions may have differential effects depending on the work-readiness of the claimants. Here, I explore whether sanctioning disabled claimants is associated with greater labour market activity or inactivity among disabled people data on 346 British local authorities between 2009 and 2014. When the number of sanctioned disabled claimants rises (as a proportion of all claimants), the disability rate among economically inactive people becomes larger. There is no clear relationship between sanctioning disabled claimants and the employed disability rate.

Keywords: conditionality; disability; labour market; sanctions; unemployment; unemployment insurance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J01 N0 R14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea and nep-ias
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Journal of Poverty and Social Justice, June, 2017, 25(2), pp. 129-146. ISSN: 1759-8273

Downloads: (external link)
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/83688/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:83688

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library LSE Library Portugal Street London, WC2A 2HD, U.K.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by LSERO Manager ().