The effects of a mixed approach toward management earnings forecasts: evidence from China

Xiaobei Huang, Xi Li, Senyo Tse and Jennifer Wu Tucker

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: Chinese regulators mandate management earnings forecasts when managers’ earnings expectations meet bright-line thresholds and allow voluntary forecasts in other circumstances. We examine the effects of this mixed approach. We find that Chinese mandatory forecasts have significant information content. Moreover, we observe a learning effect: mandatory forecasts appear to stimulate voluntary forecasts in subsequent periods as managers become familiar with the forecasting and disclosing procedures through forced experience. We find one negative consequence of the mixed approach, however: managers appear to manipulate earnings to avoid the forecast threshold of large earnings decreases. Overall, we document the pros and cons of a mixed approach toward management earnings forecasts in a major emerging market.

Keywords: China; forecast mandate; management earnings forecast; voluntary disclosure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F3 G3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-03-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cna, nep-for and nep-tra
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

Published in Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 1, March, 2018, 45(3-4), pp. 319-351. ISSN: 0306-686X

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:87113

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