Is there a selection bias in roll call votes? Evidence from the European Parliament

Simon Hix, Abdul Noury and Gérard Roland

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: We examine the magnitude and significance of selection bias in roll call votes. Prior to 2009, all recorded (roll call) votes in the European Parliament had to be requested explicitly by European Political Groups. Since 2009, a roll call vote has been mandatory on all final legislative votes. We exploit that change in the rules and compare differences between final legislative votes, amendment votes and non-legislative votes before and after 2009, using a difference-in-differences approach with extensive controls. Using data from the Sixth (2004–2009) to Seventh (2009–2014) European Parliaments, we fail to find any large differences in voting cohesion for the main political groups. We find even less significance when we control for changes in parliamentary membership between those two periods. The results suggest that selection biases in the European Parliament associated with strategic choices are negligible.

Keywords: roll call votes; European Parliament; party disclosure; natural experiment; difference in difference estimation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 P16 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-03-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in Public Choice, 10, March, 2018. ISSN: 0048-5829

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Journal Article: Is there a selection bias in roll call votes? Evidence from the European Parliament (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:87696

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