Drivers and constraints of state confiscation of elite property in the Ottoman Empire, 1750-1839

Yasin Arslantas

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: This paper examines the motives, timing and informal constraints of state confiscation in the Ottoman Empire, focusing on one of its most turbulent and confiscatory periods, 1750-1839. Utilizing a new dataset uncovered from confiscation inventories, I first demonstrate that confiscations were practiced on a selective basis, targeting some office-holders and tax farmers. Second, employing a two-step econometric framework inspired by the gradual nature of Ottoman confiscations, I argue that the initial decision whether to send an agent to confiscate one’s wealth was driven mainly by severity of war and expected costs of confiscation, while attributes of wealth and bargaining power of families vis-à-vis the central administration shaped the outcome of the second step.

Keywords: Ottoman Empire; Confiscation; State Predation; Institutions; State Capacity; Property Rights (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H1 N25 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 43 pages
Date: 2018-04
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:88096

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