Taxpayer search for information: implications for rational attention
Jeffrey Hoopes (),
Daniel Reck and
Joel Slemrod ()
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library
We examine data on capital-gains-tax-related information search to determine when and how taxpayers acquire information. We find seasonal increases in information search around tax deadlines, suggesting that taxpayers seek information to comply with tax law. Positive correlations between stock market activity and search as well as year-end spikes in information search on capital losses when the market performs poorly suggest that taxpayers seek information for tax planning purposes. Policy changes and news events cause information search. These data suggest that taxpayers are not always fully informed, but that rational attention and exogenous shocks to tax salience drive taxpayer information search.
JEL-codes: D12 D83 H24 H31 K34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Published in American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, August, 2015, 7(3), pp. 177-208. ISSN: 1945-7731
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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/88191/ Open access version. (application/pdf)
Journal Article: Taxpayer Search for Information: Implications for Rational Attention (2015)
Working Paper: Taxpayer Search for Information: Implications for Rational Attention (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:88191
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