Auction design and auction outcomes
Pantelis Koutroumpis and
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library
We study the impact of spectrum auction design on the prices paid by telecommunications operators for two decades across 85 countries. Our empirical strategy combines information about competition in the local market, the level of adoption and a wide range of socio-economic indicators and process specific variables. Using a micro dataset of almost every mobile spectrum auction performed so far—both regional and national—we show that auction design affects final prices paid. Two designs (SMRA with augmented switching and CCA with core pricing) result in auctions with systematically higher normalized returns. Further, we document that spectrum ownership appears to affect prices paid in subsequent auctions. We discuss the mechanisms of cost minimization and foreclosure faced by operators in different regulatory environments. Our findings have implications for policy-makers and regulators.
Keywords: Auction; Digital communications; Spectrum; Market power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D44 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-des, nep-gth, nep-knm and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Published in Journal of Regulatory Economics, 1, June, 2018, 53(3), pp. 275-297. ISSN: 0922-680X
Downloads: (external link)
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/88371/ Open access version. (application/pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:88371
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library LSE Library Portugal Street London, WC2A 2HD, U.K.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by LSERO Manager ().