Differentiated durable goods monopoly: a robust Coase conjecture
Francesco Nava and
Pasquale Schiraldi ()
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library
The paper analyzes a durable goods monopoly problem in which multiple varieties can be sold. A robust Coase conjecture establishes that the market eventually clears, with profits exceeding static optimal market-clearing profits and converging to this lower bound in all stationary equilibria with instantaneous price revisions. Pricing need not be efficient, nor is it minimal (equal to the maximum of marginal cost and minimal value), and can lead to cross-subsidization. Conclusions nest both classical Coasian insights and modern Coasian failures. The option to scrap products does not affect results qualitatively, but delivers a novel motive for selling high cost products.
Keywords: Coase conjecture; monopoly; product design; dynamic pricing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind and nep-mic
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Published in American Economic Review, May, 2019, 109(5), pp. 1930-1968. ISSN: 0002-8282
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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/90512/ Open access version. (application/pdf)
Journal Article: Differentiated Durable Goods Monopoly: A Robust Coase Conjecture (2019)
Working Paper: Differentiated Durable Goods Monopoly: A Robust Coase Conjecture (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:90512
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