Positive framing does not solve the tragedy of the commons

Elisabeth Isaksen (), Kjell Arne Brekke and Andries Richter

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: We investigate whether positive framing increases cooperation in three social dilemmas with slightly different properties: a linear public goods (PG) game, a non-linear PG game, and a common pool resource (CPR) game. Results from our laboratory experiments show that contributions to a linear PG are higher if the externality is framed positively, rather than negatively, corroborating earlier findings by Andreoni (1995). By contrast, we find no such framing effects in the non-linear PG game or the CPR game. In these games, the best response in the material payoffs is to contribute less if others contribute more, counteracting effects of pro-social preferences. Positive framing therefore does not help to solve the tragedy of the commons.

JEL-codes: C72 C92 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12 pages
Date: 2019-05-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-env, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-hpe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 1, May, 2019, 95, pp. 45-56. ISSN: 0095-0696

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Journal Article: Positive framing does not solve the tragedy of the commons (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:90607

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