The Holy Roman Empire at bay: financing the defence against the Ottomans, c.1560-1610

Oliver Volckart

Economic History Working Papers from London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History

Abstract: How did the Holy Roman Empire solve the collective action problem of defending itself against the Ottomans between 1566 and 1606? To answer this question, the article first reassesses the extent to which the imperial estates paid their defence dues. The new approach followed here indicates that with on average 72.5 percent, compliance rates were more than 15 percentage points lower than previously suggested. The article then statistically examines factors that influenced compliance, finding that the perceived legitimacy of the grant of a Turkish Aid by the imperial diet increased the estates’ willingness to pay. Also, it finds that several groups of estates were willing to pay larger shares than their respective control groups. It argues that while the emperor used the funds to finance the wars with the Ottomans, the primary motive of these estates for contributing was securing the emperor’s support in protecting private property rights.

Keywords: political economy; defence; Holy Roman Empire; Ottoman Empire (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H10 H26 H30 H41 N44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 2025-10
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:wpaper:129940

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