Bureau competition and economic policies in Nazi Germany, 1933-39

Oliver Volckart

Economic History Working Papers from London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History

Abstract: This article examines the hypothesis that in the “Third Reich”, bureaucratic agencies engaged in economic policies competed with each other. First, a model of competition is constructed whose predictions are then compared with actual political processes in Nazi Germany. This shows that the bureaus indeed competed with each other, supplying Hitler with political support in exchange for politically relevant property rights. However, in contrast to what the model predicts, they did not adapt their policy supply to the dictator’s wishes. In order to explain this outcome, the paper examines how Hitler protected himself against competitors to himself and how his choice of strategy affected bureau competition.

JEL-codes: B1 B2 F3 G3 N0 O52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2003-12
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:wpaper:22349

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