To take or to make?: contracting for legitimacy in the emerging states of twelth century Britain

Leigh Gardner

Economic History Working Papers from London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History

Abstract: The early twelfth century was notable for the centralization and consolidation of royal governance in the centre as well as the periphery of Europe. This paper presents a model of medieval kingship in which consent for the king’s rule is founded upon a network of bargains and agreements between the king and magnates who hold local power. The model is applied to the administration of Scotland under King David I (1124–1153). David I consolidated and expanded his authority by providing magnates who held local power with incentives to cooperate through the strategic distribution of revenue and provision of protection services, including the enforcement of property rights, dispute resolution and the facilitation of exchange. This theory is also used to explain Scotland’s appropriation of land in northern England following the death of Henry I of England in 1135, and its loss of the same territory after David I died in 1153.

JEL-codes: N93 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2008-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:wpaper:36861

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