Strategic Votes and Sincere Counterfactuals
Alaitz Artabe Echevarria and
Javier Gardeazabal
No 1988-088X, DFAEII Working Papers from University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II
Abstract:
The Random Utility Model (RUM) of voting behavior can account for strategic voting by making use of proxy indicators that measure voter incentives to vote strategically. The contribution of this paper is to propose a new method to estimate the RUM in the presence of strategic voters, without having to construct proxy measures of strategic voting incentives. Our method can be used to infer the counterfactual sincere vote of those who vote strategically and provides an estimate of the size of strategic voting. We illustrate the procedure using post-electoral survey data from Spain. Our calculations indicate that strategic voting in Spain is about 2.19 per cent
Keywords: strategic voting; self-reported vote; random utility model; voter preferences; multinomial logit (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-11-07
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Journal Article: Strategic Votes and Sincere Counterfactuals (2014) 
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Dpto. de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico II, = Facultad de CC. Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad del País Vasco, Avda. Lehendakari Aguirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain
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