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Group size and decision rules in legislative bargaining

Luis Miller () and Christoph Vanberg ()

No DFAE-II;2014-01, DFAEII Working Papers from University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II

Abstract: We conduct experiments to investigate the effects of different majority requirements on bargaining outcomes in small and large groups. In particular, we use a Baron-Ferejohn protocol and investigate the effects of decision rules on delay (number of bargaining rounds needed to reach agreement) and measures of "fairness" (inclusiveness of coalitions, equality of the distribution within a coalition). We find that larger groups and unanimity rule are associated with significantly larger decision making costs in the sense that first round proposals more often fail, leading to more costly delay. The higher rate of failure under unanimity rule and in large groups is a combination of three facts: (1) in these conditions, a larger number of individuals must agree, (2) an important fraction of individuals reject offers below the equal share, and (3) proposers demand more (relative to the equal share) in large groups.

Keywords: majority rule; unanimity rule; legislative bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 C92 D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-exp
Date: 2014-03-17
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Journal Article: Group size and decision rules in legislative bargaining (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: Group size and decision rules in legislative bargaining (2014) Downloads
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Dpto. de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico II, = Facultad de CC. Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad del País Vasco, Avda. Lehendakari Aguirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain

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