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Should Fiscal Policy be different in a Non-Competitive Framework?

Miren Arantzazu Gorostiaga Alonso

No 1988-088X, DFAEII Working Papers from University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II

Abstract: This paper studies if imperfections in the labor market justify a different fiscal policy. We present a dynamic general equilibrium model with a Ramsey planner deciding about public spending, labor taxes and debt. Two different labor market setups are considered. First we assume a competitive labor market and then we introduce a union with monopoly power. Both models reach the same conclusion as regards the cyclical properties of the optimal policy: it is not optimal to implement a countercyclical fiscal policy. We also find that government spending should be larger under perfect competition. These main results arise both under complete and incomplete markets for the debt.

Keywords: Ramsey problem; labor market imperfections; incomplete markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Dpto. de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico II, = Facultad de CC. Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad del País Vasco, Avda. Lehendakari Aguirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain

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