A note on bargaining power and managerial delegation in multimarket oligopolies

Aitor Ciarreta Antuñano (), Javier García Enríquez and Carlos Gutiérrez Hita
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Carlos Gutierrez-Hita ()

No 1988-088X, DFAEII Working Papers from University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II

Abstract: In a two-stage delegation game model with Nash bargaining between a manager and an owner, an equivalence result is found between this game and Fershtman and Judd's strategic delegation game (Fershtman and Judd, 1987). Interestingly, although both games are equivalent in terms of profits under certain conditions, managers obtain greater rewards in the bargaining game. This results in a redistribution of profits between owners and managers.

Keywords: strategic delegation; bargaining; product substitutability; price (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cdm, nep-com, nep-cse, nep-gth, nep-ind and nep-mic
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Dpto. de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico II, = Facultad de CC. Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad del País Vasco, Avda. Lehendakari Aguirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain

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