Countervailing incentives in adverse selection models. A synthesis

Iñaki Aguirre and Arantza Beitia ()

IKERLANAK from Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I

Abstract: In this paper we propose a simple method of characterizing countervailing incentives in adverse selection problems. The key element in our characterization consists of analyzing properties of the full information problem. This allows solving the principal problem without using optimal control theory. Our methodology can also be applied to different economic settings: health economics, monopoly regulation, labour contracts, limited liabilities and environmental regulation.

Keywords: adverse selection; countervailing incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehu:ikerla:14765

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Dpto. de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, Facultad de CC. Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad del País Vasco, Avda. Lehendakari Aguirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain

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