Rationing Rules and Stable Coalition Structures

Oihane Gallo Fernández and María Elena Iñarra García

No 19435, IKERLANAK from Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I

Abstract: We consider a coalition formation model in which agents have the possibility of forming part of several coalitions but are limited to participate in only one of them. Coalitions of agents produce outputs to be distributed among their members according to their aspirations and to a rationing rule prevailing in society. The outcome of such a process is a hedonic game. Using monotonicity and consistency we characterize the continuous rationing rules that induce core-stable hedonic games.

Keywords: hedonic; games; rationing; problems; core; satbility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-10-05
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Dpto. de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, Facultad de CC. Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad del País Vasco, Avda. Lehendakari Aguirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain

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