Admissible Hierachic Sets

María Elena Iñarra García and María Concepción Larrea Jaurrieta

IKERLANAK from Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I

Abstract: In this paper we present a solution concept for abstract systems called the admissible hierarchic set. The solution we propose is a refinement of the hierarchic solution, a generalization of the von Neumann and Morgenstern solution. For finite abstract systems we show that the admissible hierarchic sets and the von Neumann and Morgenstern stable sets are the only outcomes of a coalition formation procedure (Wilson, 1972 and Roth, 1984). For coalitional games we prove that the core is either a vN&M stable set or an admissible hierarchic set.

Keywords: abstract system; coalitional game; Von Neumann and Morgenstern stable set; corem; hierarchic solution; subsolution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-05
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Dpto. de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, Facultad de CC. Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad del País Vasco, Avda. Lehendakari Aguirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain

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