The Supercore for Normal Form Games

María Elena Iñarra García, María Concepción Larrea Jaurrieta and Ana Saracho

IKERLANAK from Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I

Abstract: We study the supercore of a system derived from a normal form game. For the case of a finite game with pure strategies, we define a sequence of games and show that the supercore of that system coincides with the set of Nash equilibrium strategy profiles of the last game in the sequence. This result is illustrated with the characterization of the supercore for the n-person prisoners’ dilemma. With regard to the mixed extension of a normal form game, we show that the set of Nash equilibrium profiles coincides with the supercore for games with a finite number of Nash equilibria. For games with an infinite number of Nash equilibria this need not be no longer the case. Yet, it is not difficult to find a binary relation which guarantees the coincidence of these two sets.

Keywords: individual contingent threat situation; Nash equilibrium; subsolution; Von Neumann; Morgenstern stable set (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-10
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Journal Article: The supercore for normal-form games (2007)
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