Egalitarian distributions in coalitional models: The Lorenz criterion

Francisco Javier Arin Aguirre

No 6503, IKERLANAK from Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I

Abstract: The paper presents a framework where the most important single-valued solutions in the literature of TU games are jointly analyzed. The paper also suggests that similar frameworks may be useful for other coalitional models.

Keywords: coalitional games; egalitarian criteria; prenucleolus; Shapley value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehu:ikerla:6503

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Dpto. de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, Facultad de CC. Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad del País Vasco, Avda. Lehendakari Aguirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain

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