Group Inequality and Conflict
Paul Madden and
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Paul Madden: University of Manchester
No 10/12, Department of Economics Working Papers from University of Bath, Department of Economics
This paper presents a theoretical model to show how distributional concerns can engender social conflâ€¡ict. We have a two period model, where the cost of conflâ€¡ict is endogenous in the sense that parties involved have full control over the level of conflâ€¡ict they can create. Our analysis highlights the crucial role of future inequality. It is shown, equality of assets or income in the current period does not stop conflâ€¡ict from taking place if the anticipated future inequality is signiâ€¦cant. Further we find that the impact of inequality on conflâ€¡ict is not straightforward. Since conflâ€¡ict is costly for both groups, societies with low levels of inequality show no conflâ€¡ict; groups engage in conflâ€¡ict only when inequality exceeds a certain threshold level. Additionally the model shows that the link between inequality and conflâ€¡ict may be non-monotonic.
Keywords: conflict; group inequality; nash bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Group Inequality and Conflict (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eid:wpaper:32979
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