Optimal size of majoritarian committees under persuasion
Peter Postl and
Jaideep Roy ()
Additional contact information
Saptarshi Ghosh: Shiv Nadar University
Peter Postl: University of Bath
No 43/15, Department of Economics Working Papers from University of Bath, Department of Economics
We analyze the â€˜optimalâ€™ size of non-deliberating majoritarian committees with no conflict of interest among its members when committees can be persuaded by a biased and informed expert. We find that when this bias is small, the optimal size is one; when it is intermediate, the optimal size increases monotonically in the precision of membersâ€™ private information; when it is large this relation is non-monotonic. However the optimal committee-size never exceeds five. We also show that biased persuasion typically hurts a larger committee more severely. These results provide important implications on issues like universal enfranchisement, role of expert commentary in a democracy or size of governing boards in firms.
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://purehost.bath.ac.uk/ws/files/147426277/Persuasion_27_Jul_2016.pdf Final published version (application/pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eid:wpaper:58147
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Department of Economics Working Papers from University of Bath, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Scholarly Communications Librarian ().