Securitization, Transparency and Liquidity

Marco Pagano and Paolo Volpin

No 907, EIEF Working Papers Series from Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF)

Abstract: We present a model in which issuers of asset backed securities choose to release coarse information to enhance the liquidity of their primary market, at the cost of reducing secondary market liquidity or even causing it to freeze. The degree of transparency is inefficiently low if the social value of secondary market liquidity exceeds its private value. We analyze various types of public intervention — mandatory transparency standards, provision of liquidity to distressed banks or secondary market price support — and find that they have quite different welfare implications. Finally, transparency is greater if issuers restrain the issue size, or tranche it so as to sell the more information-sensitive tranche to sophisticated investors only.

Pages: 64 pages
Date: 2009, Revised 2012-02
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (56)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Securitization, Transparency, and Liquidity (2012)
Working Paper: Securitization, Transparency and Liquidity (2010)
Working Paper: Securitization, Transparency and Liquidity (2008)
Working Paper: Securitization, Transparency and Liquidity (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eie:wpaper:0907

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