Optimal Life Cycle Unemployment Insurance
Claudio Michelacci () and
Hernán Ruffo ()
No 1411, EIEF Working Papers Series from Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF)
We argue that US welfare would rise if unemployment insurance were increased for younger and decreased for older workers. This is because the young tend to lack the means to smooth consumption during unemployment and want jobs to accumulate high-return human capital. So unemployment insurance is most valuable to them, while moral hazard is mild. By calibrating a life cycle model with unemployment risk and endogenous search effort, we find that allowing unemployment replacement rates to decline with age yields sizeable welfare gains to US workers.
Pages: 98 pages
Date: 2014, Revised 2014-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-age, nep-cta, nep-dge, nep-ias and nep-lab
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Journal Article: Optimal Life Cycle Unemployment Insurance (2015)
Working Paper: Optimal Life Cycle Unemployment Insurance (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eie:wpaper:1411
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