Admissions Reform at Chicago's Selective High Schools: Comparing Mechanisms by their Vulnerability to Manipulation

Tayfun Sönmez and Parag Pathak (mit)

No 2954, EcoMod2011 from EcoMod

Abstract: In Fall 2009, officials from Chicago Public Schools changed their assignment mechanism for coveted spots at selective college preparatory high schools midstream. After asking about 14,000 applicants to submit their preferences for schools under one mechanism, the district asked them re-submit their preferences under a new mechanism. Officials were concerned that ``high-scoring kids were being rejected simply because of the order in which they listed their college prep preferences'' under the abandoned mechanism. What is somewhat puzzling is that the new mechanism is also manipulable. This paper introduces a method to compare mechanisms based on their vulnerability to manipulation. Under our notion, the old mechanism is more manipulable than the new Chicago mechanism. Indeed, the old Chicago mechanism is at least as manipulable as any other plausible mechanism. A number of similar transitions took place in the UK after the widely popular Boston mechanism was ruled illegal in 2007. We introduce a methodology to compare mechanisms based on their vulnerability to manipulation and provide support for the recent policy changes in Chicago and UK. This paper introduces a method to compare mechanisms based on their vulnerability to manipulation. Under our notion, the old mechanism is more manipulable than the new Chicago mechanism. Indeed, the old Chicago mechanism is at least as manipulable as any other plausible mechanism. A number of similar transitions took place in the UK after the widely popular Boston mechanism was ruled illegal in 2007. We introduce a methodology to compare mechanisms based on their vulnerability to manipulation and provide support for the recent policy changes in Chicago and UK.We show that the old mechanism is more manipulable than the new Chicago mechanism. Indeed, the old Chicago mechanism is at least as manipulable as any other plausible mechanism. A number of similar transitions took place in the UK after the widely popular Boston mechanism was ruled illegal in 2007. We introduce a methodology to compare mechanisms based on their vulnerability to manipulation and provide support for the recent policy changes in Chicago and UK.

Keywords: USA and UK; Game theoretical models; Miscellaneous (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-07-06
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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