Interpreting aggression within social insect colonies: another outsider's view

Greg Pollock

ELSE working papers from ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution

Abstract: Apart from the possibility of kin coalitions, intra-colony aggression among social insects seems naturally a contest over reproductive resources decided by differential competitive ability. Yet employing economic game theory's concept of a coordination mechanism provides another interpretation of intracolonial aggression where "winning" is not a matter of personal merit, but a group efficient method of task allocation; such a mechanism is capable of satisfying the usual requirements for evolutionary stability. Several examples of intra-colony aggression are reinterpreted as instanced task coordination independent of "individual competitive ability", thereby removing potential empirical inconsistencies arising from standard measures of "competitive ability." Social competition and coordination are contrasted to reveal when one, but not both, may be applicable to observed aggression.

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