Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics

Tilman Börgers () and Rajiv Sarin

ELSE working papers from ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution

Abstract: This paper considers a version of Bush and Mosteller's stochastic learning theory in the context of games. We compare this model of learning to a model of biological evolution. The purpose is to investigate analogies between learning and evolution. We and that in the continuous time limit the biological model coincides with the deterministic, continuous time replicator process. We give conditions under which the same is true for the learning model. For the case that these conditions do not hold, we show that the replicator process continues to play an important role in characterising the continuous time limit of the learning model, but that a di®erent e®ect (\Probability Matching") enters as well.

Keywords: Games; Learning; Evolution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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ftp://ftp.repec.org/RePEc/els/esrcls/replic.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics (2010)
Journal Article: Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:els:esrcls:051

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