Communication Equilibria with Partially Verifiable Types

Francoise Forges and Frederic Koessler

No 2003-10, THEMA Working Papers from THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise

Abstract: This paper studies the set of equilibria that can be achieved by adding general communication systems to Bayesian games in which some information can be certified or, equivalently, in which players' types are partially verifiable. Certifiability of information is formalized by a set of available reports for each player that varies with the true state of the world. Given these state-dependent sets of reports, we characterize canonical equilibria for which generalized versions of the revelation principle are valid. Communication equilibria and associated canonical representations are obtained as special cases when no information can be certified.

Date: 2003
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Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics 41, 2005, pages 793-811

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Journal Article: Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types (2005)
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