Political Competition over Distortionary Taxation

Matias Nunez ()
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Matias Nunez: Université de Cergy-Pontoise, THEMA

No 2009-09, Thema Working Papers from THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS

Abstract: Political parties compete over income tax functions, and voters vote and decide whether to pay full taxes or to make an e®ort to modify their tax bur- den. We show that political parties only propose e±cient income tax func- tions, in a similar manner to the probabilistic voting theory. Regarding the shape of income tax functions, it need not be the case that the majority of vot- ers prefer progressive taxation to regressive taxation as a consequence of the distortions. Nevertheless, we prove that the political appeal for progressivity is restored under mild conditions.

Keywords: Income taxation; Distortions; Efficiency; Progressivity; Political competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 H23 H31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe, nep-pol and nep-pub
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ema:worpap:2009-09

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