Inefficient Predation, Information, and Contagious Institutional Change
Paul Maarek () and
Michael Dorsch ()
Additional contact information
Michael Dorsch: The American University of Paris
No 2012-32, THEMA Working Papers from THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise
This paper presents an agency theory of revolutionary political transitions from autocracy to democracy. We model authoritarian economic policy as the equilibrium outcome of a repeated game between an elite ruling class and a disenfranchised working class, in which workers have imperfect information about the elite's policy choice and the economy's productive capacity. We characterize the conditions under which, in equilibrium, (i) the elite will set inefficient economic institutions under the threat of revolution, (ii) information shocks can catalyze democratic revolutions that may be contagious among similar countries, and (iii) democracy can be consolidated following a political transition.
Keywords: Political transition; Revolution; Asymmetric information; Contagion; Democratic consolidation; Arab Spring (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D74 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Inefficient predation, information, and contagious institutional change (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ema:worpap:2012-32
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in THEMA Working Papers from THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Stefania Marcassa ().