A Map of Approval Voting Equilibria Outcomes

Sébastien Courtin and Matias Nuñez

No 2013-31, THEMA Working Papers from THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise

Abstract: It is commonly accepted that the multiplicity of equilibria is ubiquitous in preference aggregation games with any voting method. We prove that this multiplicity is greatly reduced under some mild restrictions over social preferences when each voter can vote for as many candidates as she wishes (the Approval voting method). For scenarios with three candidates, we can hence build a map that associates any preference profile to its set of equilibria outcomes; this map is very close to the most well-known Tournament solutions.

Keywords: Approval voting; Condorcet winner; Voting equilibria; Asymmetric Societies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://thema.u-cergy.fr/IMG/documents/2013-31.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: A Map of Approval Voting Equilibria Outcomes (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ema:worpap:2013-31

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in THEMA Working Papers from THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Stefania Marcassa ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).