Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules

Marcus Pivato

No 2014-16, Thema Working Papers from THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS

Abstract: Given a large enough population of voters whose utility functions satisfy certain statistical regularities, we show that voting rules such as the Borda rule, approval voting, and evaluative voting have a very high probability of selecting the social alternative which maximizes the utilitarian social welfare function. We also characterize the speed with which this probability approaches one as the population grows.

Keywords: utilitarian; relative utilitarian; approval voting; Borda; scoring rule. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic, nep-pol and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules (2016)
Working Paper: Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rule (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ema:worpap:2014-16

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