Dummy players and the quota in weighted voting games: Some further results

Fabrice Barthélémy () and Mathieu Martin ()
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Mathieu Martin: Université de Cergy-Pontoise, THEMA

No 2020-01, THEMA Working Papers from THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise

Abstract: This paper is a companion paper of Barthelemy et al. (2019) which studies the role of the quota on the occurrence of "dummy" players in small weighted voting games (i.e., in voting games with 3, 4 or 5 players). We here extend the results obtained in this paper by considering voting games with a larger number of players (up to 15). It is shown that the probability of having a player without voting power is very sensitive to the choice of the quota and the quota values that minimize this probability are derived.

Keywords: Cooperative game theory; weighted voting games; dummy player; probability of voting paradoxes. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des, nep-gth and nep-ore
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http://thema.u-cergy.fr/IMG/pdf/2020-01.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Chapter: Dummy Players and the Quota in Weighted Voting Games: Some Further Results (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ema:worpap:2020-01

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