A Byzantine Agreement Protocol for Game Theorists

Helmuts Azacis and Péter Vida ()
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Péter Vida: CY Cergy Paris Université, THEMA

No 2025-04, THEMA Working Papers from THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise

Abstract: We introduce a new Byzantine agreement protocol consisting of two stages of private communication which substitutes public communication (broadcasting to all the players) in a very strong sense. At every information set, players hold the following consistent beliefs (Kreps and Wilson (1982)): every player believes, no matter what messages she has sent or received, that the bitwise-majority message of every player is the same. We provide applications of our result.

Keywords: Byzantine agreement; broadcasting; public communication; consistent beliefs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ema:worpap:2025-04

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