The non-optimality of deductible contracts against fraudulent claims: an empirical evidence in automobile insurance

Georges Dionne () and Robert Gagné ()

No 97-23, Thema Working Papers from THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS

Date: 1997
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Working Paper: The non-optimality of deductible contracts against fraudulent claims: an empirical evidence in automobile insurance (1997)
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