Contratación de ejecutivos en un oligopolio mixto: Un juego de asignación con externalidades

Sergio Montero Fortes
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Sergio Montero Fortes: Division of Economics, CIDE

Undergraduate theses (Spanish) from CIDE, División de Economía

Pages: 94 pages
Date: 2011-05
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:emc:tunder:tesl003

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